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Abstract—A smart grid network adjusts power allocation by 
collecting information about the power usage of the customers in 
real-time. Authentication and user privacy preservation are the two 
major concerns on smart grid security. Authentication schemes that 
preserve users’ privacy from third parties, but not from the power 
operator, have been proposed. In this paper, we propose a scheme 
that preserves users’ privacy information, including their daily 
electricity usage pattern from third parties as well as from the power 
operator. At the same time, the scheme ensures that authentication 
can be properly done. These two properties are achieved by using 
anonymous credential under the principle of blind signature. 
Basically, a customer generates a set of credentials by himself and 
asks the control center to blindly sign them. When the customer 
needs to request more power later on, he presents the signed 
credential to the control center as proof of his identity. 
Implementation and analysis show that our scheme is feasible in 
terms of a number of performance measures such as the signing time 
and the credential collision rate. 
Index Terms—smart grid network, authentication, privacy 
preservation, anonymous credential, blind signature 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this paper, we focus on two major security issues on the 
communication between the smart meter at the customer 
premises and the control center maintained by the power 
operator. Since the requests made by the customers determine 
the power allocation of the substations, authentication must be 
done to prevent abuse or attack. Privacy issue has also been 
raised in earlier discussions of the smart grid system [2] [3]. 
For example, by observing the power consumption of a family, 
it is easy for a criminal to know when the family is not at 
home, and to burglarize it. This concern also applies to 
commercial customers. A company having a power failure 
could be at risk if it is revealed. We propose a scheme that can 
preserve the privacy of the customers not only to third parties, 
but also to the power operator. At the same time, our scheme 
provides authentication to prevent hackers from abusing the 
system. Blind signature is used to achieve privacy preservation. 
In our scheme, a customer first generates a set of 
credentials (analogous to tickets) and blinding factors. 
Customer “blinds” the credentials and then requests the 
control center to sign them using the control center’s private 
key. When the customer needs more power, he will send a 
credential to the control center anonymously and the control 
center will adjust the power for the area where the customer is 
located. 
Simulations and mathematical analysis show that our 
scheme is feasible in terms of credential signing time, 
communication loading and credential collision chance. 2048-
bit credential signing using a laptop takes only 10 minutes. 
Suppose each customer performs this once per month, the total 
amount of upload and download per month are only about 
10MB and 2.5MB, respectively. We also show that credential 
collision is extremely unlikely when 128-bit length credential 
identities are used. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Related 
work is reviewed in Section II. The system model and the 
security requirements are described in Sections III and IV 
respectively. Some preliminaries are given in Section V. Our 
schemes are presented in details in Section VI. Security 
analysis, discussions and performance analysis are listed in 
Sections VII, VIII and IX respectively. We conclude our paper 
in Section X. 
 
II. RELATED WORK 
The smart grid project was started by the European Union 
in 2003 [5]. At about the same time, Electric Power Research 
Institute of the USA started the IntelliGrid Project [6] and the 
US DOE also initiated the Grid 2030 project [7]. In 2010, 
NIST released a report [4] which describes the potential 
components and cyber security issues of the smart grid system. 
A recent work [8] proposes a communication-oriented 
smart grid framework. New requirements of the 
communication architecture and possible security problems of 
the smart grid system are also identified. 
Some major security problems have been pointed out and 
studied [2] [3]. On the communication between the control 
center and the smart meter, it is proved that statistical analysis 
approach cannot protect the system from false data injection 
attack [9]. It would also be infeasible for the smart grid system 
to adopt this approach since the system will need to handle a 
large amount of data in real-time, but the control center of the 
smart grid system only has a few seconds to respond. A 
solution has been proposed recently [10], which can provide 
user authentication and some level of user privacy 
preservation. 
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 III. SYSTEM MODEL 
Following [10], we assume that a smart gird network can 
be simplified into three basic layers to form a hierarchical 
structure. At the top level, there is a control center maintained 
by the power operator. At the second level, there are 
substations inside the distribution network and each substation 
is responsible for the power supply of an area. At the lowest 
level, there are smart meters which are placed at the homes of 
the customers. 
Smart meters should send power requests to the control 
center when they need more power (say when it finds that the 
current power level is not enough to run all appliances in a 
customer’s home). The control center can be a single server 
located inside the power plant or be distributed servers located 
at different geographical locations for load-balancing purposes 
and to avoid single point of failure. 
In this paper, we focus on the challenge of the 
trustworthiness of the parties involved. From the power 
operator’s point of view, its control center and substations are 
more trusted than the customers since the control center and 
substations are usually physically protected1. Smart meters, on 
the contrary, are not physically protected and can be 
compromised by dishonest customers or even by hackers who 
can then abuse the system. From the customers’ point of view, 
the power operator as well as its control center and substations 
are only semi-trusted. They perform security operations 
honestly but they may acquire the electricity usage pattern of 
the customers and hence deduce the private information of the 
customers (e.g. when they are at home). As such, customers 
do not want to reveal too much of their private information to 
the power operator. 
The communication channels from the smart meters to the 
control center and from the substations to the control center 
may be the Internet which is public and is always considered 
as unsafe.  
 
IV. SECURITY REQUIREMENT 
We aim at designing a system to resolve the following 
security problems:  
a) Message authentication: Every request message sent by 
any smart meter should be checked to confirm that it is from a 
valid user. Authentication is the basis of the system. Without it, 
anyone can abuse the system easily. 
b) Identity privacy preservation: The real identity of the 
customer during the power requesting phase should be 
unknown to everyone, including the power operator to protect 
the privacy of customers. 
c) Request message confidentiality: The amount of power 
requested by any smart meter should not be known by any 
third party in order to protect the privacy of the customers. 
d) Tracebility: The total amount of power requested by each 
customer in a certain period of time should be known by the 
power operator (i.e. its control center) so that it can correctly 
charge each customer at the end of the charging period.  
 
                                                           
1 There are also concerns on attacks directed against the substations and the 
control centers, but this is not the focus of this paper. 
V. PRELIMINARIES 
A. Blind signature 
Blind signature is a method to allow a first party, Party 1, 
to sign a message generated by a second party, Party 2, 
without knowing its actual content. When a third party, Party 
3, receives the signed message, it can verify that the message 
is signed by Party 1. In our scheme, we make use of this 
technique to allow the control center (Party 1) to sign a 
credential generated by a customer (Party 2) without knowing 
its actual content. At a later time, the control center itself 
(Party 3) can verify that the credential is indeed signed by it 
without knowing who requested it to sign or when it was 
signed. 
Next let us describe the technique in more details. We 
assume that the first party, Party 1, possesses a public and 
private key pair, (e, n) and (d, n) generated under the RSA 
principle. Party 2 creates a message M for Party 1 to sign. But 
before that, Party 2 blinds M using a random blinding factor F. 
The blinded version of M is represented by X = (MFe) mod n. 
Party 2 sends X to Party 1 for signature. Next, Party 1 
generates its signature on X as SIG(X) = Xd mod n. Party 2 can 
then retrieve SIG(M) (i.e. Party 1’s signature on the actual 
message M) by multiplying F-1 to SIG(X) where F-1 represents 
the modular multiplicative inverse of F. The resulting 
signature is represented by SIG(X) × F-1 = (Xd mod n) × F-1 = 
(MdFed) mod n × F-1 = Md mod n = SIG(M) because Fed = 1. 
This is just Party 1’s signature on the actual message M. 
Hence, when Party 3 receives SIG(M), it can verify using (e, 
n) that M is indeed signed by Party 1. 
The usage of blind signature technique in our scheme is as 
follows. The customers will prepare a set of credentials, each 
stating the amount of electricity to request, and ask the control 
center to sign them blindly so that the customer can submit 
any of these credentials for the request of electricity. 
 
B. Blind signature with message verification 
Since Party 1 does not know the actual content of the 
message sent from Party 2, it cannot verify it in a traditional 
way. To prevent Party 1 from signing an invalid message or a 
message that it does not want to sign, there is a method to 
verify the message before Party 1 signs it. This technique is 
widely adopted in e-cash schemes like [12]. Party 2 generates 
n messages using different blinding factors. It then blinds the n 
messages and sends them to Party 1. Next, Party 1 randomly 
chooses m messages (m < n) and challenges Party 2 to reveal 
them by providing the m blinding factors. If the m blinding 
factors are correct, Party 1 accepts the signature request and 
signs the remaining (m – n) messages. 
Note that in this example, Party 2 can cheat Party 1 
successfully with a probability of (n – m) / n. Obviously, a 
tradeoff in such a scheme is between the chance of cheating 
and the number of redundant messages required. The more the 
redundant messages used, the lower the chance that Party 2 
can cheat Party 1. 
In our scheme, we make use of this technique to ensure that 
the control center only signs valid credentials. 
 
VI. DETAILS OF OUR SCHEME 
In our scheme, we assume that any smart meter can 
communicate with the control center via a secure 
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communications channel. That is, every message transmitted 
is encrypted (say using AES encryption) and third parties 
cannot read the contents without the key concerned. 
The basic idea of our scheme is to make use of the blind 
signature technique for the control center to sign credentials 
on behalf of customers. In this way, when a customer presents 
a credential anonymously (without any information about the 
customer’s identity provided), the control center cannot tell 
which customer is making the request, yet it can verify the 
signature to confirm that it is from a valid customer because 
only valid customer can request for blind signatures. At the 
end of each month, each customer sends the unused 
credentials back to the control center to evaluate the amount of 
power he has requested so far. 
Next let us describe our scheme in details. 
A. Setup phase: 
During system startup, the control center assigns itself an 
RSA public and private key pair for signing credentials. The 
public key is assumed to be known by everyone while the 
private key is only known by the control center. 
Whenever a new smart meter is registered, it will be 
assigned a unique identity for identification purpose and a 
secret value for authentication purpose (details of their usage 
will be discussed later). 
 
B. Registration phase: 
At the beginning of each month, the registration phase will 
be carried out. This phase is not anonymous. Customers need 
to be authenticated using their real identities in this phase. For 
this purpose, the smart meter submits its identity and secret 
value to the control center (via a secure channel) to 
authenticate itself. This phase continues with the following 
steps: 
Step 1: Each customer (with the help of his/her smart meter) 
sends credential signing requests to the control center. Each 
credential Ci is of the format: (CID, date of issuance, value). 
CID is a unique credential identity for each credential. Date of 
issuance indicates the date that the credential is issued. Value 
is the amount of power that the credential holder can request. 
Step 2: For credentials of each value, n credentials with n 
different CIDs and blinding factors, where n is pre-determined 
by the control center, are generated. Among them, the control 
center requests the customer to open (n – 1) of them for 
verification purpose. Here the message verification scheme 
mentioned in Section V.B above is used. 
Step 3: If the information in all the “opened” credentials is 
valid, the control center signs the remaining one. Otherwise, it 
requires the customer to re-submit its request. 
Step 4: The customer retrieves the control center’s signature 
on the actual credential by multiplying the inverse of the 
blinding factor to the received signature (for details please 
refer to Section V.A). 
Step 5: The customer repeats Steps 2 to 4 for each credential 
value. 
Step 6: The control center calculates and records the number 
of credentials for each value that it has signed so far into its 
local database. 
Step 7: The smart meter of the customer stores these signed 
credentials properly for later usage. Since a smart meter can be 
considered as a tamper-proof device, we assume that the 
stored signed credentials cannot be modified by an outsider 
easily. 
C. Power requesting phase:  
Power requesting phase can be executed at any time during 
the month when the smart meter of a customer finds that it 
needs more power to support all the electric appliances in the 
apartment. This phase is anonymous. Customers do not have 
to authenticate themselves in this phase and the validity of the 
customers is represented by the anonymous credentials. The 
control center cannot determine the identity of each individual 
customer.  
To request for more power, the smart meter of a customer 
randomly picks a signed credential of the desired value and 
sends it to the control center. The control center then verifies 
its own signature on the credential and checks the date of 
issuance to see whether the credential is up to date. It also 
checks if the credential number included has been used 
already. If yes, that credential will be considered as invalid. To 
facilitate this checking, the control center maintains a list of all 
used credential numbers. If the above checking is successful, 
the control center accepts the credential and continues to 
process the request. Otherwise, it rejects it and asks the smart 
meter to present another credential in order to complete the 
power request. 
 
D. Reconciliation phase:  
At the end of each month, a reconciliation phase will be 
carried out. Note that similar to the registration phase, this 
phase is not anonymous. Customers need to be authenticated 
using their real identities in this phase. The smart meter of a 
customer sends all the credentials which have not been used to 
the control center. The control center then checks the 
credentials as usual, calculates the sum of their values, N, 
among all unused credentials and calculates the total requested 
amount R by computing (T – N). 
To check against whether a customer requested the same 
amount of power as he used, we use a traditional kWh meter 
to collect the monthly power consumption and the system will 
compare the consumption with R to see whether the two 
values are comparable. If there is a big difference between 
them, an extra charge can be added to the monthly bill of the 
customer. 
 
VII. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In this section, we evaluate our scheme according to the 
security requirements listed in Section IV. 
A. Message authentication 
At the registration phase, a customer needs to authenticate 
himself/herself using the private key signature before 
requesting any signing of credentials. So when the customer 
presents the signed credentials during the power requesting 
phase, he proves himself/herself authenticated. 
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B. Identity privacy preservation 
Customers only reveal their identities during the 
registration and the reconciliation phases. During the power 
requesting phase, when the customer presents the credentials, 
the control center only knows whether the credential is from a 
valid user or not. Due to the properties of the blind signature, 
the credential identity is only known by the owner. The 
credentials do not reveal the identity of the customers. 
C. Request message confidentiality  
As we mentioned earlier, we assume that a smart meter 
communicates with the control center via a secure channel. 
Therefore, the amount of power requested by any smart meter 
cannot be known by any third party. Confidentiality of the 
request message is preserved. 
D. Tracebility  
In the registration phase, a customer needs to present 
his/her identity (i.e. not anonymous) to obtain signed 
anonymous credentials. In the reconciliation phase, a customer 
again needs to present his/her identity to the control center. 
Therefore, the total amount of power requested by each 
customer in a certain period of time (say a month) can be 
known by the control center. The customer can then be 
properly charged at the end of the charging period. 
 
VIII. DISCUSSIONS 
In our scheme, the smart meter is used to handle the 
request of the credentials and to send them to the control 
center when power is needed. It stores its ID and password, a 
few public keys of the control center and the signed 
credentials. Even if a hacker compromises his own smart 
meter, it will not benefit him/her. This is because he/she 
cannot change the values of the credentials since a valid 
credential should be signed using the control center’s private 
key. 
The smart meter is not used to protectthe benefit of the 
power operator. It is used to protect the customers’ credentials 
by insulating the smart grid system from other computer 
system (such as OS of PC) to avoid malware and hacker 
attacks. We can assume that as long as the customer does not 
try to hack the smart meter, it will be safe for him to use the 
system. 
In a nut shell, the benefit of the power operator will not be 
harmed even when the smart meter is compromised. For the 
customer, as long as he keeps the smart meter from the 
hackers physically, it will be safe. 
 
IX. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS 
In this section, we analyze the performance of our scheme 
in different aspects: credential signing time, communication 
overhead, and credential collision. 2048-bit credential signing 
using a laptop takes only 10 minutes. Suppose each customer 
performs this once per month, the total amount of upload and 
download per month are only about 10MB and 2.5MB, 
respectively. We also show that credential collision is 
extremely unlikely when we use 128-bit credential ID. Thus, 
our scheme is feasible in terms of performance. 
 
A. Credential signing time  
Credential signing is a bottleneck of our scheme. To make 
sure that our scheme is feasible, we implement this part to 
analyze its performance. 
We have written a test program in Java to measure the 
time needed for RSA signature on the credentials. We have 
tested our performance on a laptop computer with an Intel 
Core 2 Duo CPU, T5870 @ 2.00 GHz. The testing process 
only ran on a single core. The results are shown in Table 1 and 
Figure 1. Although 512 bits RSA is not secure nowadays, it is 
shown here for a better comparison with 1024 and 2048 bits 
RSA.  
 
Table 1. Signing 10000 credentials with RSA private key of different size 
Key size (bits) 512 1024 2048
Time (second) 12 73 511
 
Assume that on the average, each customer uses 10,000 
credentials per month, which means the control center needs 
to sign at least 10,000 credentials for each customer. From the 
data we obtained from the experiment, signing 10,000 
credentials using a consumer PC with 1,024 bits RSA needs 
about 1 minute, while 2,048 bits RSA needs 10 minutes. 
Recall that the signing happens on the control center side, 
which means this process can be done a lot faster by using 
control center machines or even RSA hardware. It is also 
straight forward to apply multi-threading on credential signing. 
 
Figure 1. RSA encryption time 
Also, customers need to prepare blinding factors which 
also require modular exponentiation. However, the exponent 
part of the public key can be assigned with a small number, so 
that the exponentiation can be done in a much shorter time, 
and a cheaper device is required on the customer side. 
 
B. Communication overhead 
The amount of data transmission between the control 
center and the customer should be within a feasible range and 
it is always better to transmit less. 
Credentials dominate the data transmission in our scheme. 
The size of a credential mainly depends on the key size of the 
RSA signature since the content is usually smaller in size (< 
1024 bits). So let us assume that the credential size is equal to 
the key size. 
Assume that each customer uses about 10,000 credentials 
every month. Then at the beginning of each month, each 
customer will request the control center to sign 10,000 
credentials and the control center will send them back. 
Assume that we use the message verification in the blind 
signature and check 2 messages out of 3, thus requiring the 
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customer to send 20,000 more credentials. Furthermore, let us 
ignore other control messages since they are relatively small in 
size. Then the total amount of data being uploaded to the 
control center is about 10 MB per month while the total 
amount of data being downloaded from the control center is 
about 2.5 MB per month. We believe that such a small amount 
of data transmission should not cause any burden to the 
network since in the future, a smart grid will probably be built 
on top of the public Internet. 
 
C. Credential collision 
In our protocol, since the control center does not know the 
credential identity in the registration phase, it cannot avoid 
two or more credential registrations with a same credential 
identity (and same timestamp). We call this credential identity 
collision. The discovery of this possible problem is inspired by 
the Birthday Paradox – the chance of having two persons 
among a few dozen of people with the same birthday is 
extremely high [11]. We suspect there might be a similar 
problem in our scheme. When credential identity collision 
happens, only one of the credentials will be accepted, and 
others will be ignored. With a few simple calculations, we will 
show that the chance of this credential collision is negligible. 
One way to decrease the chance is to increase the 
credential identity size so that any two randomly picked 
credential identity will have less chance to collide. Assume the 
credential identity is k bits in size, and there is a total of p 
valid credentials registered in the same period of time.  
The chance that an arbitrary credential collides with 
another random generated credential is A = 1/2k. The chance 
for a credential NOT to collide with the other p credentials is 
B = (~A)p = (1 - 1/2k)p. The chance for a credential to collide 
with any of the other p credentials is C = 1 – B = 1 - (1 - 1/2k)p. 
 
 
Figure 2. Chance of collision 
The chance C drops sharply when k goes up to about 55 
bits, and we would normally pick 64 or 128 bits and therefore, 
it is not a problem at all (see Table 2). 1014 credentials is much 
more than enough for a city. We can even partition the area so 
that credential identity from different partitions will not affect 
each other.  
Table 2. Chance of collision 
Size of CID 55 64 128
1014 0.00277 5.42 × 10-6 2.94 × 10-25
1017 0.938 0.00541 2.94 × 10-22
1020 ~1 0.996 2.94 × 10-19
 
Even when collisions occur, we have two options to resolve 
the situation. In the first option, the control center ignores the 
collided credential. The customer concerned does not have to 
send another credential and can go ahead to consume the 
power. Since the power represented by each credential is 
relatively small as compared to those supplied by the 
substation, and a substation usually supplies a little more than 
enough power to ensure voltage stability, the power supply 
will not be affected. In the second option, the control center 
knows the credential is collided and asks the customer to send 
another credential. At the end of the month, the amount of 
power requested by that customer will be a bit higher than his 
actual power consumption. If we allow a reasonable difference 
between the requested amount and the actual consumed 
amount, possible credential collision can be ignored. 
 
X. CONCLUSIONS 
This scheme is applicable not only for smart grid. Due to its 
simplicity and few restrictions, it is also compatible to other 
systems. This scheme is much more efficient compared with 
other protocols that use zero-knowledge proof, which usually 
create a huge load on the communication channel. 
Implementation details of our proposed scheme such as the 
communication channel or the protocol are not discussed in 
depth here. But they must be able to maintain the same 
security requirement as the scheme does. For example, AES 
encrypted communication channel should be used in the 
registration phase and reconciliation phase to prevent message 
exposure by packet sniffing. Appropriate protocol should be 
chosen for the power requesting phase to maintain anonymity 
of the customer. In the future, we will study other security and 
privacy-preserving problems in the smart grid network. 
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